The Israeli blitz dubbed Operation Arrow of Bashan is the clearest manifestation yet of an Israeli preemptive doctrine. It eliminated the vast majority of Syria’s strategic capabilities, and took over the buffer zone on the Syrian border—including the Syrian side of the strategic Mount Hermon.
This concept is the direct result of the bankruptcy of the previous Israeli approach to securing its defenses, namely through deterrence-based containment, as evidenced by Hamas’ October 7 attack.
Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu’s declaration on December 10 all but made the new doctrine official. “We want relations with the new regime in Syria. But if this regime allows Iran to return to establishing itself in Syria or allows the transfer of Iranian weapons or any other weapons to Hezbollah…we will respond strongly. And we will exact a heavy price. What happened to the previous regime [in Syria] will also happen to this regime."
The last time Israel was on such war footing was in 1967 when the Israeli Air Force (IAF) intercepted the majority of the Egyptian Air Force while still in its airbases, followed by a lightning ground offensive in the Sinai Peninsula aimed to destroy the Egyptian military buildup there.
Since then, two IDF campaigns, one in Syria and one in the West Bank, could be seen as precursors to the new preemptive doctrine. In Syria, the “war between the wars” was designed to block arms transfers to Hezbollah and prevent Iranian proxies dispatched to the country from deploying on the Israeli border. Similarly, operations in the West Bank were aimed at eliminating emerging terrorist cells.
A harbinger of the new approach was also on display on August 25, 2024, when the IDF took out hundreds of Hezbollah’s rockets and drones about to be launched into Israel.
However, in the case of Syria, there was hardly a sign that (deposed) President Bashar Assad’s leftover strategic arms were about to be aimed against Israel. Yet the mere existence of such armaments, plus the uncertainty as to their future, was enough to put the new policy into gear.
There should be no doubt that, in adopting the preemptive doctrine, Israel was buoyed by the extraordinary accomplishments of its military in the war against Iran’s “axis of resistance.” From a strategic point of view, the IDF’s recent victories have infused much credibility into the new Israeli policy.
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In addition, the protracted and costly campaigns waged by the IDF helped dispel any notion that Israelis lacked the will to confront their enemies for fear of suffering heavy military casualties. On the contrary, it is now clear that soldiers of the IDF, believing they are engaged in an existential fight, are highly motivated and determined to vanquish their enemies. In this vein, the main attraction of a preemptive doctrine is its promise to shorten the duration of any conflict and thus minimize its costs in terms of lives and treasure.
Also, there is no denial the recent military triumphs have restored Israel’s self-confidence and the public’s trust in the IDF’s ability to effectively confront the country’s enemies.
Combined, the preemptive Israeli doctrine can be assessed as based on verifiable intentions that are backed by adequate capabilities which are evidenced by their performance on multiple fronts simultaneously.
In activating the new defense concept vis-a-vis Syria, Israel was not only seeking to address a potential strategic threat there but also to send a warning to its other enemies. One of the main targets was undoubtedly Hezbollah. Israel is signaling that any effort by the Lebanese terrorist organization to rearm and/or move closer to its northern border will not be tolerated and will be subject to the full force of the IDF.
The second and most important intended recipient of the Israeli preemptive action in Syria was Iran. Tehran must now consider that any attempt to reconstruct its “ring of fire” around Israel will not only fail, but also expose it directly to severe Israeli retribution.
In addition, the Israeli defense establishment surely realizes that Tehran’s incentives to go nuclear have peaked now that its “strategic depth” has essentially collapsed, especially after the takeover of Syria by jihadi Sunnis.
The mullahs may also feel that by acquiring nukes they will rehabilitate Iran’s battered position among the remaining pieces of the “axis of resistance,” and that exportation of the Islamic revolution could then resume in earnest.
After all, Iran’s Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khameini already pledged on December 11 that the setbacks in Syria would only strengthen the resistance: “The more you [Israel and the U.S.] add pressure, the more steadfast it [the resistance] is, the more crimes you commit, the more it is motivated,” he declared.
But the Iranians must also know that breaking out to the bomb will be the most dangerous under the current circumstances. First, the deterrent provided by Hezbollah against an Israeli attack on Iran’s nuclear facilities has been effectively eliminated now that its “second strike” capability has been destroyed by Israel. Second, after the Israeli attack on Iran last October, the country is essentially devoid of an air defense system to stop the IAF.
Moreover, with the latest Israeli preemptive action in Syria and the obliteration of what was described as the “densest air defense network in the world,” the IAF will be essentially unopposed on its way to Iran (Incredibly, the IAF now exercises air superiority, if not air dominance, over a significant portion of the Middle East to include Syria, Lebanon, Iraq and Iran).
Lastly, the Israeli action in Syria is a surefire sign that Israel is no longer reliant on deterrence but has shifted to a preemptive doctrine.
It should be noted that one of the IAF’s targets in Syria was its weapons of mass destruction—both its chemical weapons and their production facilities. This should especially catch the eye of any Iranian contemplating crossing the nuclear threshold.
Israel’s enemies now understand that one of the costs of the October 7 attack, besides the destruction of Hamas and the dramatic degradation of Hezbollah’s capabilities, is the doctrinal transformation of the thinking in Jerusalem from a country relying on deterrence to one depending on preempting emerging threats.
Moreover, for their own sake, these opponents must appreciate that this offensive concept will govern the future plans and operations of a military that has just decisively demonstrated its supremacy over all of Israel’s enemies in the Middle East.
- Dr. Avigdor Haselkorn is a strategic analyst. He has been widely published on national security issues.