The IDF concurs that fighting against Hamas will resume in the foreseeable future. Hamas will not be disarmed, remaining a persistent threat that must be addressed. Even if combat initially remains aerial after Phase II of the hostage deal, a military foothold will persist. Forces will operate in a reinforced buffer zone, which will serve as a launchpad for raids deeper into Gaza when needed—and such operations will be necessary.
Even after the deal, Hamas will retain tens of miles of underground tunnels, enabling weapon production, recruitment and training. The IDF will have no choice but to continue uprooting this infrastructure.
Currently, the IDF is fighting in Gaza without a clear, long-term strategic goal, leaving the Israeli public paying a heavy price in lives, as military cemeteries grow almost daily.
Members of Israel’s government, including its prime minister, are actively sustaining Hamas as a weakened and battered asset—following the same pre-October 7 strategy. The government’s reluctance to make weighty political decisions, coupled with public apathy toward the mounting casualties and strained combat personnel, forces the army to fight slowly, with minimal efforts and in circles. The most challenging battles in Gaza are yet to come.
The IDF has not conducted significant operations in Khan Yunis, Gaza's largest city by area, in over six months. Hamas still commands experienced leaders there, such as Rafah Brigade Commander Mohammed Shabaneh. The terror group maintains control over a massive and densely populated displaced population stretching from Nuseirat through Deir al-Balah to Rafah’s outskirts.
The IDF has also yet to re-enter Gaza City itself, with its large and challenging neighborhoods like Shijaiyah, Daraj-Tuffah, Shati Camp, Sabra, Rimal and others. A renewed campaign in Jabaliya and its surroundings has lasted about four months, costing the IDF around 60 soldiers in areas it had already maneuvered through in late 2023.
Gaza City now holds a larger population than Jabaliya did before the current operation—approximately 100,000 people—making the campaign there longer and far more grueling.
Cabinet focusing on micro-tactics
Cabinet ministers, inexperienced in security and lacking political courage, are preoccupied with a myriad of matters—except making meaningful, long-term decisions.
A deadly terror attack in Samaria? The ministers order the IDF to apprehend the assailants and bolster settlement defenses. Hamas resumes rocket fire on southern Israel? The ministers demand the IDF respond with force in Gaza.
'While fending off blame for the October 7 failures, senior IDF officials repeatedly plead with the political echelon behind closed doors: give us a directive to achieve a political objective in Gaza'
The Cabinet remains fixated on micro-tactics, addressing issues with populist gestures as though the defense minister were a regional brigade commander and Minister Orit Strock a division operations officer—not national leaders entrusted with the state’s future.
Soldiers continue to fall, week after week, without a clear strategic goal to justify their sacrifices. If there were a real objective—one promising long-term security for the residents of southern Israel—it might make sense. But the price is steep, and as the funerals pile up, the question arises: What is all this for? There’s no vision, no true purpose—only circular fighting, hesitant ministers and a public more interested in Ryanair’s latest deals to Vienna and Berlin. The “breaking news” alerts about another fallen soldier feel far less significant in comparison.
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Two months ago, a political spin surfaced to prolong the legitimacy of endless warfare in Gaza. The claim: private American contractors would oversee humanitarian aid distribution in Gaza, bypassing Hamas.
The idea, trumpeted as a breakthrough in the media, was dismissed with derision in the IDF Southern Command, where officers knew it would collapse under the weight of reality—just like the infamous American floating pier project, which amounted to a flimsy dock that failed before even a single shipment passed through it last winter. The contractor initiative, like other political spins, may work for TV headlines but holds little relevance on the ground.
While fending off blame for the October 7 failures, senior IDF officials repeatedly plead with the political echelon behind closed doors: give us a directive to achieve a political objective in Gaza.
Whether it’s re-establishing settlements to enhance security and partially reverse the disengagement, reinstating Israeli military governance or establishing a local Gazan administration supported by the Palestinian Authority under Egyptian and Emirati sponsorship—just decide.
But nothing happens. Even far-right or moderate-right plans for Gaza and the western Negev are too daunting for this government to consider. Every discussion is postponed, every initiative fizzles out. Instead, the government releases photos of ad hoc Cabinet subcommittee meetings featuring ministers like Bezalel Smotrich and Orit Strock, creating an illusion of progress while avoiding substantive decisions.
The suspicion of re-settlement
It’s no surprise that retired generals suspect the true goal here is re-establishing settlements in Gaza. However, the government is cunning enough not to reveal this to the soldiers’ parents or reservists. Ministers know that any political objective for Gaza will be controversial, requiring domestic and international persuasion campaigns, extensive planning, significant budgets and long-term sacrifices. There are no free gifts—except, it seems, the lives of soldiers, which the ministers are willing to sacrifice without justification.
Let’s recall: the government holds a democratic mandate to decide on any objective it deems fit, based on its ostensibly right-wing agenda. But "toppling Hamas’ civilian and military rule" is not a war goal; it’s a lie fed to the public since the war’s first week—a hollow spin unless it answers the critical question: Who will govern the 2 million Gazans after Hamas, the very population that enabled the group to grow into a terror army and that continues to shield its survival?
The military’s leadership, under constant attack, is too weak to voice this truth. The next IDF chief of staff will likely have to pledge loyalty to the current government’s narrative: send soldiers into the alleys of Zeitoun, and after the hostage deal, we’ll figure out what’s next—perhaps after Trump takes office, or following a dialogue with Saudi Arabia about regional peace. For now, let them fight.
Avoiding accountability
No one will accuse the IDF or the government of failing to meet the war's objectives while it drags on, despite the fact that it effectively ended in the south a year ago and in the north about six weeks ago. The intermittent fire since then has been far smaller in scale than the rounds of escalation Israel faced in the last decade or the prolonged horrors of the Second Intifada, which no one ever thought to call a war.
The IDF recently held a heated discussion, rife with disagreements, on whether to further disrupt the 2025 reserves schedule due to the government’s unexpected demand to station hundreds of soldiers in Syria following Assad’s downfall, alongside the emerging trend that military forces will remain in Lebanon even after the initial 60 days of the cease-fire.
Worn-out reservists are expected to serve, on average, two to three months in the coming year—after already enduring between six months and a year of service, and in some cases even more, since the war began. This level of reserve duty is unprecedented in the state’s history.
The government is wary of overburdening the reservists again, especially with the introduction of the new Haredi draft-dodging law set to be presented to the Knesset’s Foreign Affairs and Defense Committee.
The tasks in enemy territory across three fronts are being carried out primarily by regular forces, a decision made reluctantly. The IDF argues it is absurd to waste a top-tier regular unit, like the Paratroopers Brigade, patrolling the pastoral ravines of the Rukkad Valley in southern Syrian Golan, instead of using them as a strike force where they are desperately needed against Hamas.
Yoav ZitunPhoto: Yair SagiThe peculiar mission in Syria could and should be carried out by reserve forces, but that would further strain them—and the cycle repeats. This is the challenge the IDF faces as it tries to deploy its forces across multiple fronts, with operations now focused on the small town of Beit Hanoun after nearly completing the mission in Jabaliya.
Soon, battalions stationed in the northern theatre will be reassigned to routine security missions in the West Bank, yet another front that could overextend the already-stretched IDF.
The IDF knows what the government is trying to obscure: the military urgently needs thousands of additional combat soldiers lost during the war—needed yesterday—to fulfill even its most modest objectives.
The painful truth is clear to all: military cemeteries will continue to fill with young secular and religious soldiers alike in the coming year. Without bold political decisions—which remain conspicuously absent—there is no hope for meaningful change in the next 10 to 20 years.