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Residents of the Gaza border communities remain uncertain about returning home, even after the IDF presented its findings from investigations into the failures leading up to and on October 7. "You've shown us the mistakes, the malfunctions and the findings. But what’s next? How can you guarantee October 7 won't happen again?" they asked. No senior officer, past or present, had an answer.
One officer admitted the truth: only a high-level inquiry, like a state commission, could provide real answers and help Israel understand how the massacre on October 7 could take place — and, more importantly, how to prevent another invasion.
Significant gaps remain in the investigations focused solely on the military’s performance. Some agencies, including the Magen David Adom emergency medical service, the Israel Police and even the Shin Bet did not cooperate with the military’s probes. Each had its own reasons, despite thousands of medics, officers and security personnel having worked closely with the IDF.
Investigators also faced overwhelming workloads. The probe into Kibbutz Nir Oz initially involved a senior artillery corps officer but later required retired Maj. Gen. Eran Niv to step in due to the scale of the failures. Many investigation team leaders were active-duty commanders juggling frontline combat in Gaza and Lebanon alongside their probe duties.
One officer, Col. A., who commands a reserve brigade under the 98th Division, earned the nickname "Nahal Oz Brigade Commander" from his troops because of his repeated visits to the overrun base where 53 soldiers were killed.
IDF leadership was also uneasy that many of those questioned — from brigade commanders to senior generals — consulted lawyers provided by the military before responding to investigators. "It was clear who sought legal advice and who didn't," a military source said.
External review team appointed
A year after he rejected the idea, Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu approved former IDF chief Herzi Halevi’s request to appoint an external review team to reassess the military’s investigations, issue recommendations for command (mostly symbolic, as some officers involved have already retired) and oversee implementation of lessons learned.
Led by former IDF Southern Command chief Sami Turgeman, the team includes retired generals who will examine concerns over investigator bias. For instance, the Southern Command's inquiry was led by Brig. Gen. (res.) Tal Hermoni, who was part of the command on October 7 and is still serving there.
During the attack, he was the command’s home front officer working alongside his superior, Southern Command chief Maj. Gen. Yaron Finkelman, in the main war room in Be’er Sheva, giving orders.
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In another case, an investigator was a brigade commander who had fought in the very battle he was assigned to review. While no one questioned their integrity, their inquiries were inherently limited — military leadership instructed them not to assign personal measures such as dismissals or reprimands.
The only investigator to defy this order was Col. A., who reviewed the battle at the Nahal Oz base. Given the extent of the failures, the culture of negligence and the blatant disregard for operational orders he uncovered, he refused to avoid personal accountability.
Sensitive findings withheld
The investigations released to the public so far — including the next one, set to be shared with families and survivors of the Nova music festival — have omitted key aspects and completed reports, such as those concerning the IDF’s Gaza Division and intelligence units like Unit 8200.
The military has reasons for this: These reports contain severe allegations from mid-level officers about critical failures, ignored warnings and a culture of complacency.
Golani Brigade commanders, for example, were deeply frustrated with Southern Command leaders, who failed to provide them with grenades or adequate combat gear in advance and withheld intelligence known on the night of the attack. Golani units were manning the frontline that Saturday.
Other forces present that weekend for training were furious to learn that no one in the operations division, led by Brig. Gen. Shlomi Binder knew they were available, armed and ready to deploy. "We lost one to two crucial hours — hundreds of troops could have reached the Gaza border by 9:00 a.m. instead of 11:00 a.m.," one internal report noted.
At the war’s outset, a senior military official warned that conducting investigations mid-fighting would weaken the army by fueling blame games. He likely didn’t anticipate the war dragging on indefinitely. The way the military chose to investigate itself — and the limited, filtered manner in which findings have been presented — reveals how deeply that fear influenced the process.
Some within the military argue that the investigations paint such contradictory narratives that it’s hard to believe that the same officers were involved in the same events. In the Gaza Division, for instance, Brig. Gen. Avi Rosenfeld, who commanded it on October 7, still insists the division didn’t collapse.
"The war room’s lights may have been out for 10 minutes, but the real failure was intelligence, not our response," he claimed.
The IDF maintains that "many lessons learned have already been implemented, including larger forces and readiness changes. As for the investigators, due to the volume of inquiries — over 50 — some were led by active-duty officers rather than reservists.
“To restore public trust, we worked to complete and present the findings. We chose not to issue personal recommendations to ensure interviewees spoke freely, focusing on improvement rather than blame."