Two major issues are delaying the end of the war in Gaza. First is the lack of progress on the hostage situation: Hamas demands a cease-fire before even considering any negotiation, whether large or small, and so far, Israel has not been asked for concessions concerning the Philadelphi or the Netzarim corridors.
Second, there’s been no sign of progress on establishing a new governing authority to replace Hamas’ civilian rule in Gaza. While some Arab nations, including the UAE and Saudi Arabia, have shown willingness to participate in an international peacekeeping force and civilian administration, they insist that the Palestinian Authority under Mahmoud Abbas be involved in any governance and policing structure.
Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, however, opposes this due to political reasons and concerns that his coalition could collapse under pressure from far-right ministers in Otzma Yehudit.
Currently, Netanyahu’s plan for an alternative civilian administration in Gaza seems to hinge on intensifying pressure on the international community, particularly the United States, driven by the humanitarian crisis in Gaza.
Roughly 70% of Gaza’s population is concentrated in its center and western areas, which cover only about 25% of the territory, and they are living in tents and makeshift shelters with winter approaching, worsening their hardship. Humanitarian aid is scarce, with much of it looted by Hamas and local gangs.
Netanyahu appears to be calculating that the current situation will pressure the international community to drop its insistence that Mahmoud Abbas be part of a governing authority in Gaza.
Alternatively, he anticipates they might ask the IDF to establish a military administration in Gaza, aligning with demands from the religious-right wing of his coalition. This faction sees military governance as a precursor to the possible re-establishment of Jewish settlements in the Gaza Strip.
Essentially, Israel’s government and Cabinet are waiting for the international community to press for a civilian administration to replace what remains of Hamas’ rule, which is already almost non-existent.
At present, Hamas still maintains control in neighborhoods and areas that the IDF has not entered. Complicating matters further is the difficulty in distributing humanitarian aid to those in need, leading to tensions and even potential embargo threats from the U.S.
While aid trucks enter Gaza from Israel, they face looting on the way to distribution centers in western Gaza, or they are intercepted by Hamas, crime families and profiteers who sell the supplies at inflated prices.
In response, the IDF is focused on its primary objective: providing security and a sense of safety to residents in southern Israel while maintaining military pressure to secure the return of hostages.
Current operations, especially in northern Gaza, are aimed at preventing Hamas and Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ) from rebuilding their capacities to wage guerrilla and terror attacks on Israeli border communities.
5 View gallery
Humanitarian aid trucks entering Gaza from Israel through Kissufim crossing
(Photo: COGAT)
Until now, the IDF’s primary focus in Gaza has been dismantling the large-scale terror armies of Hamas and PIJ, which operated both above and below ground. Now, it has shifted to eliminating the remaining small cells and Hamas’ attempts to reestablish command centers and resistance hubs within Gaza.
Hamas has reportedly been using funds earned from looted humanitarian aid and repurposing explosives from unexploded IDF ordnance to create makeshift bombs, while also recruiting teenagers, aged 14 to 17, to join its ranks as armed operatives.
This effort is currently centered in northern Gaza, where the greatest threats loom over Israel’s major Negev communities, though it may extend southward. The IDF aims to apply sustained pressure on Hamas’ leadership in Qatar, pushing for flexibility on hostage negotiations. In response, Hamas has tried to deflect this pressure by circulating reports of mass starvation and displacement in northern Gaza to the south.
Looking to the future, the IDF plans to maintain an intelligence-operational presence in Gaza—without full occupation, military governance or direct responsibility for humanitarian distribution.
To provide security for Israeli civilians in the absence of a broader diplomatic solution or hostage deal, the IDF intends to establish “secure corridors,” including control over the Philadelphi Corridor, alongside a security buffer zone approximately a kilometer wide on Gaza’s side of the border.
The objectives of the IDF's corridor strategy in Gaza are as follows: First, to establish intelligence operations that closely monitor activities within Gaza, aimed at detecting any Hamas attempts to rebuild its military capabilities.
Second, the corridors would allow IDF forces rapid deployment to any area in Gaza where intelligence identifies renewed weapons production, rocket fire or preparations for terror attacks and guerrilla operations by Hamas or other groups.
Third, the IDF aims to prevent external support to Hamas, particularly from Sinai and Egypt, by controlling the Philadelphi Corridor. This would continue until an agreement is reached with Cairo on securing the route to stop above- and below-ground smuggling of weapons and raw materials into Gaza.
Fourth, the corridors would regulate the movement of Gaza’s population as a pressure tactic on Hamas to release hostages, while restricting the movement of Hamas operatives toward northern Gaza.
For example, the Netzarim Corridor would shift from a logistical route to a control zone, providing a 7-by-9 kilometer corridor for military oversight, allowing operations north toward Gaza City and south toward the central camps in Khan Younis.
Fifth, the corridors are intended to allow international actors to securely bring in and distribute humanitarian aid. The IDF does not want to manage aid distribution itself, as doing so would require maintaining divisions in Gaza on a permanent basis, with the risk of Israeli soldiers being harmed or killed while escorting aid convoys or distributing supplies.
This ground system is already in advanced stages of establishment and is expected, according to IDF planning, to remain in place for several years until a hostage release agreement is reached. Such a deal would likely necessitate adjustments to both ground operations and broader policies concerning Gaza’s future.
In the absence of a hostage agreement or an alternative governing body in Gaza, the IDF will continue setting up these corridors while avoiding the establishment of an Israeli military administration in the region.
Get the Ynetnews app on your smartphone: