In February 2013, Mehdi Taeb, a radical Iranian cleric, told a student conference supporting the Iranian regime that “Syria is Iran’s 35th province” and declared it held greater importance than Iran’s Khuzestan Province along the Persian Gulf.
While his comments drew criticism in Iran, they reflected a deeply entrenched view within Iran’s leadership: extending influence beyond its borders was critical for national defense.
In 2019, Iran’s Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei met Syrian President Bashar Assad for the first time since the civil war began and referred to Syria as Iran’s “strategic depth.”
From the onset of Syria’s civil war in 2011, Iran backed Assad, fearing the regime’s collapse could lead to Sunni dominance or control by al-Qaeda-linked groups, which would represent a strategic defeat and sever Iran’s ability to support Hezbollah in Lebanon, thereby collapsing the so-called "Axis of Resistance" it has endeavored on building.
To Iran’s leadership, Assad’s downfall represented the loss of its frontline in the war with Israel. The Syrian civil war was also viewed in Tehran as part of a broader "Zionist-Western" conspiracy aimed at undermining Iran’s regional influence.
Khamenei described Assad as a “sick patient” unaware of his dire condition
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The decision to intervene militarily in Syria’s civil war was fraught with internal dissent. Then-president Mahmoud Ahmadinejad initially argued that propping up Assad was futile, as his “historic role” in the region had ended. Ultimately, Khamenei decided to intervene.
Hossein Hamadani, Iran’s former commander in Syria, later revealed that Khamenei was more concerned about the situation than Assad himself. He described Assad as a “sick patient” unaware of his dire condition, requiring intervention to stabilize his rule.
Iran’s support included deploying thousands of Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) fighters, providing billions of dollars in aid and recruiting Shiite militias from abroad to bolster Assad’s forces. The “Axis of Resistance” became central to Iran’s strategy, exploiting the weaknesses of Syria and Iraq to establish a military, political and economic foothold.
While Iran appeared dominant for years, recent events have exposed cracks in its regional hegemony. In 2018, anti-Iran demonstrations in southern Iraq culminated in the torching of Iranian consulates. A year later, Lebanese protests demanded the resignation of a government led by Iran’s allies.
The 2020 assassination of IRGC Quds Force commander Qasem Soleimani dealt a major blow to Iran’s influence, weakening its grip on Shiite militias. Meanwhile, Israeli airstrikes in Syria have restricted, though not stopped, Iranian operations, like providing Hezbollah with advanced weapons systems.
Shia Crescent dangerously close to collapse
Recent dramatic developments—including Israel’s successes against Hezbollah, intensified airstrikes in Syria and the fall of Assad—have placed the Shia Crescent in unprecedented jeopardy. While Iran is unlikely to abandon its regional ambitions, the collapse of Assad’s regime is a significant setback.
The IRGC-linked Fars News Agency described Assad’s fall as an opportunity to “bolster the resistance,” noting Syria’s role within the broader front including Yemen, Iraq, Lebanon and the Palestinian territories.
A former Iranian parliament member suggested that despite the Sunni Islamist composition of Syria’s rebel forces, dialogue with them was possible due to shared opposition to Israel.
The gravity of the situation for Iran is underscored by images of Syrian rebels vandalizing the Iranian embassy in Damascus—symbolic of the repercussions for Iran’s influence in Syria and the region.
For Israel, the current instability presents an opportunity to capitalize on Iran’s weakened position. By forging alliances and promoting a new strategic vision, Israel can work to establish a stable and enduring regional order.
- Dr. Raz Zimmt is a senior researcher at the Institute for National Security Studies (INSS) and a research fellow at the Alliance Center for Iranian Studies at Tel-Aviv University.