What Israel vigorously denied just a week ago is no longer possible to deny: If there are no last-minute surprises, then Israel and Hamas are closer than ever to another hostage deal - which will include a list of 33 living and dead Israeli hostages in its first phase, and only later, apparently, all of the hostages.
This leaves the families of the 65 hostages who were left out of Phase I, which was defined as a "humanitarian exchange" - and from which hostage Youssef Ziyadne, whose body was returned to Israel in an IDF operation, was certainly removed.
Amid hopes for the return of 33 hostages in Phase I, families have valid concerns that Phase II may not be implemented. With over a year passing between previous deals and negotiations like those for Gilad Shalit taking more than five years, fears of delays are justified.
And while some talk unrealistically about releasing the hostages without releasing terrorists from prison, in practice this is clearly not the case - and when you add to this the heavy prices that Phase II entails for Israel, a very large diplomatic maneuvering space is needed for it to ultimately be implemented.
On the surface, and although much is still hidden from view regarding the details of the outline, it is already clear that throughout Phase I, the IDF will remain in the buffer zone in the Gaza Strip, will hold positions on the Philadelphia Corridor, and will evacuate the Netzarim Corridor only while activating a screening mechanism for Gazans who wish to return to the northern Gaza Strip. Alongside this, it is clear that the phase also includes comprehensive and extensive humanitarian aid.
However, Phase II, which includes the end of the war, effectively constitutes the beginning of "the day after" in the Gaza Strip - and therefore the list of demands that Hamas presented in the past regarding it has repeatedly crossed all of Israel's red lines.
The terrorist organization's main demand for the release of the 65 Israeli and foreign hostages, which are its last bargaining chip, is to end the war. This is a complete end, a "sustainable peace" without reservations, within the framework of which Israel will fully withdraw from the Gaza Strip and allow billions of dollars from other countries to pour into its reconstruction.
In addition, Hamas is expected to demand the release of a larger number of prisoners for each soldier not included in the Phase I outline - while it also defines the young civilian men as "soldiers". The terrorist organization, which wants to present some achievement for the murderous surprise attack it carried out and which also brought disaster to Gaza, is expected to demand that Israel also release more "heavyweight" prisoners in Phase II. These include, for example, Palestinian leaders such as Marwan Barghouti or Hassan Salameh - a friend of Mohammed Sinwar and a senior member of Hamas' military wing, who is serving 46 life sentences.
Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, for his part, has repeatedly reiterated in recent months that he will not agree to an end to the war without achieving all of its goals, which include the return of all the hostages - but also the collapse of Hamas' rule.
Defense Minister Israel Katz even demanded that the IDF present him with a "plan for defeating Hamas" if the hostages are not released, and claimed that any talk of "the day after" is irrelevant now, since no other force will replace Hamas as long as the terrorist organization maintains its military strength.
However, the IDF, on orders from the political echelon, refrains from operating in areas in the Gaza Strip where hostages are believed to be present, and it is unclear how the terrorist organization can be eliminated without presenting alternatives that will rule the Gaza Strip the day after. According to Yaron Blum, who was the country's coordinator of prisoners and missing persons between 2017 and 2022, one of the main problems with the talks is Israel's avoidance of discussing "the day after."
Another challenge expected to surface during Phase II, and possibly even during Phase I, is Hamas' use of cynical tactics in negotiations. As seen in the past deal, the group may introduce "scapegoats" during implementation, forcing Israeli decision-makers into difficult dilemmas and potentially undermining trust. Israel has prepared for this by retaining significant leverage in Phase I, including control of the buffer zone in Gaza and the Philadelphi Corridor.
However, these levers will diminish during Phase II. To ensure the release of all hostages, it is crucial that Hamas has something to lose, such as tying Gaza's full rehabilitation to the completion of the process. A third phase guaranteeing this linkage has already been proposed as a solution.
Blum highlights another potential lever: While Hamas’ internal leadership focuses on surviving and maintaining control in Gaza, its external leadership seeks to preserve its presence in Qatar and Turkey. If the U.S. applies pressure on these countries to expel Hamas operatives, it could destabilize the organization’s external operations. This, in turn, might force Hamas’ internal leadership to accept an agreement, even if it significantly weakens its position in Gaza.
The obstacles in the way and the open questions
One of the main difficulties the mediators encountered was the goal declared by each side - which means that the outline for ending the war must allow both Israel and Hamas to declare "victory." In other words, if the unexpected does not happen, and Hamas does not back down from its demand to end the war, the question arises of what guarantees Israel will receive that the terrorist organization will indeed not take an active part in governing Gaza. In addition, Israel's security demands must also be met: From the government's perspective, the war must end with no more force in the Gaza Strip that poses a threat to it.
Opponents of this approach, including within the defense establishment itself, argue that those who were abandoned should first be returned to the country - and that the super-strategic goals should not be attempted at their expense. The IDF claims that they will know how to deal well with a complete withdrawal. Blum described the concept well: "The Gaza Strip is not going anywhere, and it will be possible to return to fighting. Hamas will give us the circumstances to do so." So far, the prime minister and many of his ministers have not agreed to this.
In any case, even assuming that the parties agree to go to phase two, which, as stated, includes a return to sustainable calm and a cessation of military operations, the question arises as to what will happen when the participants in the massacre begin to move in the Strip - and Israel will have intelligence on their locations? It could be the Gaza Brigade Commander, Izz ad-Din Haddad or Rafah Brigade Commander Mohammed Shabana, or even Mohammed Sinwar, who replaced his brother Yahya as the leader of Hamas in Gaza. It is clear to every Israeli that these people are mortal, but Hamas is expected to demand that Israel not be able to harm its people.
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Another question is how Israel will prevent Hamas from regaining power, and how extensive the mandate it will receive for this will be. In Lebanon, for example, the IDF still attacks Hezbollah targets from time to time on various grounds. It is unclear to what extent Hamas will agree to such Israeli involvement after the end of the war, or whether Israel will act in parallel with the process of releasing the hostages in a way that could lead to its arrest.
Post-war Gaza and Saudi Arabia
In an attempt to overcome this, the mediators are trying to present an alternative to Hamas rule "the day after." But while Hamas and Palestinian Islamic Jihad have ostensibly agreed to the establishment of a committee of Gazan technocrats to run the enclave, under the control of the Palestinian Authority, it is precisely Chairman Mahmoud Abbas who refuses. Fatah says that they will not cooperate with such a committee, since they claim it is Hamas' way of returning to power - by placing figures identified with it in key positions.
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Mohammed bin Salman Saudi Crown Prince Saudi Arabia
(Photo: AFP PHOTO / HO / SAUDI PRESS AGENCY SPA)
In addition, and since Hamas' military power has not been completely eliminated, and the terrorist organization is not expected to agree to disarm, it could pose enormous difficulties for any government that takes its place.
All of this leads to the obvious conclusion that in order to embark on Phase Two and the "day after," Israel needs to be granted a certain degree of security freedom in the Gaza Strip, something Hamas has so far refused. It may allow a committee not on its behalf to run Gaza, and relinquish its position as the dominant organization, but as mentioned, this will not completely prevent its strengthening, nor will it allow Israel the security calm it expects.
But despite all this, the issue of the "day after" in the Gaza Strip has another axis: Saudi Arabia is not expected to normalize its relations with Israel as long as the war continues. It is also expected to demand a "path" to a Palestinian state, and an Israeli withdrawal from the Gaza Strip - along with agreements regarding the Palestinian Authority's rule there - could serve as an anchor for it. In addition, if Israel agrees to a Saudi and Emirati presence in the Gaza Strip, these countries could help enforce the ceasefire outline and also prevent the rise of Hamas.
Last week, the United Arab Emirates had reportedly agreed to participate in the management of Gaza temporarily, along with the U.S. and other countries, and to take care of matters of governance, security, and reconstruction of the destruction - and also to send forces at the invitation of the Palestinian Authority. However, in a letter recently sent by coalition members to Netanyahu, they demanded that Israel not rely on any foreign entity - and not allow another force to replace the IDF in Gaza.
All of the problems mentioned here have been addressed in recent weeks by Strategic Affairs Minister Ron Dermer who is trying to reach an understanding with the Trump administration regarding what will happen if various scenarios materialize.
Israel officials say that while the Biden administration did not provide Israel with full backing, and more than once limited it in armaments, with Trump things are expected to be easier; the assessment is that if the new U.S. president sees that Hamas is not behaving properly and is violating the agreement, then the IDF will have the green light to "enter into it," but here too these are only estimates, and right-wing figures recently protested the "pressure" that Trump is reportedly exerting on Israel to reach an agreement.
So what do brokers do?
Arab mediators and media outlets emphasize Phase I in their references to the deal, and for good reason. The U.S., Egypt, and Qatar believe that the first phase is the hardest "opening blow," which will lead to a dynamic that will knock down the obstacles on the way to a final end to the war. Therefore, they prefer to "get the parties pregnant" - and discuss the most complex issues during a lull in the war, during which hostages will be released from time to time.
Blum supports this approach and says that despite all the problems, "we should not talk about Phase II, but rather motivate the other side to agree to Phase I. This will create a relationship of trust between the murderous terrorist organization and Israel, which must release all 98 hostages - four of whom have been there for about 11 years." He explains that in the first phase, there are international guarantees, and estimates that "the parties will begin to talk at a low intensity, out of a desire not to blow up the talks."
At the same time, Egypt is trying to accelerate the agreements between Fatah and Hamas, in order to present a suitable alternative government that can rehabilitate the Gaza Strip without the funds flowing en masse into the production of weapons.
According to a report in Qatari newspaper The New Arab in November, Cairo is actually working against Hamas on two parallel axes: the first is the axis of negotiations, and the second is an axis that focuses on intra-Palestinian reconciliation talks, believing that the success of its efforts in Gaza depends on achieving an intra-Palestinian agreement and establishing a committee to govern Gaza.
In addition, sources involved in the negotiations believe that if Donald Trump accepts the Gaza Strip without war, he will not allow Israel to easily renew it. In light of his aggressive rhetoric in recent days, it does not seem that the president-elect will easily give up on the release of the remaining 65 hostages - especially since continuing the war would jeopardize normalization with Saudi Arabia, which is out of the question for him.
However, there is a major caveat: this is a president whose steps are almost impossible to predict, and certainly not to rely on. It is also unclear what Trump's people promised Netanyahu, and whether the prime minister agreed to a "small deal" because he believes the Republican president will achieve much more for him later.
Returning to uncertainty
"There have never been negotiations like this, in any respect," says attorney Uri Slonim, who was the advisor on captives and missing persons to eight defense ministers in the past, and even managed the negotiations for the release of the missing navigator Ron Arad.
According to him, the fact that the government is linking the release of the hostages to the dismantling of Hamas is also unprecedented, and therefore it is very difficult to estimate what will happen in the second phase.
"There are so many additional components to these negotiations, such as the unique circumstances in which they were conducted during fighting or the scope of the prisoners. War is a dynamic thing, and things can change on the ground in a second."
Blum, meanwhile, suggests that the country do everything it can to free the hostages and not blow up the agreements. "We've created a situation where the Iranians are not in the region, and they will have a problem transferring funds to Hamas," he said. "The isolation of the terrorist organization helps us, and there's also the mediators' fear of Trump and our desire to start off on the right foot with him."
Therefore, he concludes: "If they do sign Phase I, I will be optimistic, because the momentum will be in our favor." In any case, the IDF is preparing for all possibilities - a full or partial withdrawal - and the possibility of staying and resuming fighting after Phase I.