Recently, the IDF Military Intelligence Directorate’s chief decided to elevate the department responsible for oversight within the unit to an autonomous brigade, expanding its powers beyond its former focus on research and evaluation.
This critical initiative isn’t afforded a grace period or time to learn and develop doctrines. An urgent need to challenge foundational concepts, operational methods and promoted objectives is already present, as well as the need to question emerging paradigms within both military and political ranks.
The primary focus must be on Gaza, Israel's current main front of operation. The gap between slogans like “more force will yield concessions” or “we’re nearing absolute victory” and the harsh reality becomes starker by the day.
This raises a pressing question about the deeper purpose of continuing the campaign. While Israel’s leadership maintains ambiguity, the public must demand clear answers.
The first gap relates to the ongoing operation in northern Gaza, which continues to claim lives long after the IDF has caused massive destruction to the area and inflicted severe damage on its terror infrastructure.
At this point, it’s critical to pose "devil’s advocate" questions: Has the wide-scale operation brought Israel closer to its strategic goals of toppling Hamas or softening its stance on releasing hostages?
The answer seems to be negative. Moreover, like other phases of the war, the operation reflects military successes but lacks a strategic framework — particularly regarding what happens next in the region: military supervision, a buffer zone or possibly control by American companies.
It’s vital to ask what the roadmap is for the operation in northern Gaza and the war as a whole. Assuming the current campaign is completed, will the focus shift to another area for a similar effort? And are there estimations that the next target offers a better chance of dismantling Hamas and freeing the hostages?
The second gap requiring examination concerns the IDF’s operational approach since early 2024 — continuous raids instead of holding territory. This method has revealed significant flaws from the outset.
The IDF repeatedly returns to areas it initially captured but then vacated, only to find Hamas reestablishing control. Senior U.S. military figures, past and present, pointed out last year that Israel's approach to warfare is unusual and unlikely to yield strategic changes on the ground.
The third gap concerns the war's objectives and necessitates a candid dialogue with the political leadership. According to reports published last week, Defense Minister Israel Katz instructed the IDF to prepare a plan for "defeating" Hamas if the terror organization refuses to release hostages.
This is precisely where it's essential to clarify what "defeat" means when dealing with an organization like Hamas, which has already lost most of the military capabilities it held before October 7.
Eradicating Hamas entirely is unfeasible. Significantly limiting its presence is only achievable if Israel takes control of the entire Gaza Strip for an extended period — a scenario the government doesn't appear inclined to pursue. Chasing down "the last Hamas terrorist" holding a weapon is also not a realistic goal.
At this juncture, it’s necessary to confront the reality: 15 months into the most intense war in the history of the Israeli-Palestinian struggle, Hamas, despite suffering heavy losses, remains Gaza’s dominant power.
No internal or external actor appears as an alternative to it. There’s no public outcry against Hamas, which continues to demonstrate adaptability and resilience in both governance and military capabilities, allowing it to survive and maintain influence across Gaza.
A fourth gap pertains to the post-war period, particularly ideas surrounding a new order, about which it’s unclear whether critical discussions are being held. Recently, reports emerged of a plan to promote cooperation with local clans in Gaza in hopes they could become a viable alternative to Hamas, particularly regarding the distribution of humanitarian aid.
Here, too, a “devil’s advocate” approach is necessary, drawing lessons from past scenarios — such as when Israel believed it had found "allies" who later proved unreliable and violent, like the Phalangists in Lebanon.
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In Gaza, it’s worth scrutinizing the nature of these clans (some of which are criminal groups with jihadist ideologies) and mulling the consequences of relying on numerous tribal entities instead of a single centralized authority.
Dr. Michael MilshteinThe test of the oversight division demands an immediate challenge to dominant thought patterns regarding all these issues. In many cases, this involves opposing ideas widely supported by politicians and military figures who conceived them and are eager to prove their success — just as happened with the cease-fire arrangements that collapsed on October 7.
Dr. Michael Milshtein is the head of the Forum for Palestinian Studies at the Dayan Center of Tel Aviv University.