There's no need to sugarcoat the reality: the emerging cease-fire and hostage release deal is bad for Israel, but it has no choice but to accept it. A country that became deeply entangled in such a severe and complex event on October 7, 2023, carries a moral obligation to the civilians dragged from their beds and to the soldiers abandoned by the military they enlisted in.
This doesn’t absolve us from confronting the grim future awaiting on the other side, given the numerous gaps in the proposed framework.
The tragic incident in Beit Hanoun on Tuesday, along with the fierce battles in Jabaliya, highlights a central issue with the agreement — resuming combat. Since October, 55 officers and soldiers have fallen in the region, 15 of them in Beit Hanoun just this past week.
This is happening in an area where the IDF already claimed victory and declared most of the population evacuated. However, soldiers and officers testify that the operation wasn't being conducted properly: the forces deployed were insufficient and lacked adequate heavy equipment.
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The Nahal Brigade acknowledged an under-discussed issue — soldiers are utterly exhausted. They've been fighting intermittently since October 7 with minimal leaves. The effects are evident. As this war is being managed, it hasn't yielded sufficient results.
This raises the question: if the agreement allows residents to return to northern Gaza (and not just innocent civilians will seize the opportunity), how will Israel ensure it can resume fighting if Hamas decides to break the deal?
The costs will be far higher than what we've paid so far. Incidentally, withdrawing from the Philadelphi Corridor — once deemed essential by Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu just months ago — now seems less dangerous. However, flooding the area with a civilian population will turn any renewed combat into a nightmare.
Conversely, the severe errors in Beit Hanoun highlight the army's urgent need for reinforcements, including replacing commanders who've already admitted their responsibility for October 7.
IDF Southern Command chief Maj. Gen. Yaron Finkelman made grave errors in allocating responsibilities for the sectors. It was reported that the 143rd “Gaza” Division was tasked with managing the buffer zone along the entire border, Rafah in the south and the battles in Beit Hanoun.
This is an unreasonable scope of vastly different missions, creating a fatal gap in the division's attention, resources and ability to handle the intensity of Hamas' resistance.
How can we tell that the IDF recognizes this failure? Only hours after the tragic incident, responsibility for Beit Hanoun was transferred to the 162nd Division, fighting in neighboring Jabaliya.
Fifteen months into the war, the military has yet to truly dismantle Hamas' military wing — a clear failure of its mandate.
Yossi YehoshuaMeanwhile, decision-makers haven't acted to establish an alternative to governance in Gaza. This leaves us with a deal where we’re paying a heavy price that should've been reserved for a comprehensive agreement — not a partial one. Once this deal is done, the leverage needed to ensure subsequent stages will disappear.
We can only hope that U.S. President-elect Donald Trump at least made promises in earnest — and, most importantly, intends to keep them.