The military incursion into Rafah must be stopped. Not because the International Court of Justice ordered it, but because the cost outweighs the benefit. We can debate for days the judges' motives, their integrity and their judicial rigor, but it won't save Israel.
The Rafah story starts in Israel's War Cabinet, not in the hallowed halls of the ICJ. There were two reasonable times for an attack on Rafah: one at the start of the ground operation, the second before or simultaneously with the attack on Khan Younis.
The proposals were on the table. They remain on the table. In the meantime, the displaced population has been allowed to gather near the border, in the same area Israel sought to attack. It made sense to push Hamas away from the Egyptian border and destroy the tunnels between Gaza and Sinai, under the Philadelphi Route. Blocking the smuggling routes, at least some, would have made it difficult for Hamas to receive supplies. However, Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu insisted on turning Rafah into a victory shot instead of focusing on the strategic route.
According to the military, this is folly. Rafah is not Berlin, not Masada, not the Alamo. Dismantling the four remaining battalions there will finish the job but not eliminate Hamas' capability to launch rockets at Israel, kill soldiers and continue to hold hostages. Following American and ICJ pressure, the Israeli government was forced to promise that the operation in Rafah would be "limited." That is a promise that is easy to say, but hard to keep. Sending three brigades to Rafah created a dynamic that is difficult to maintain. The troops do not storm Rafah, but move from house to house, to protect each other.
Despite all, I assume the responsible Biden administration will veto any one-sided resolution and prevent a diplomatic disaster. However, if the upcoming UN Security Council discussion takes place during intense fighting in Rafah, the cost will be dire. Countries may impose sanctions on Israel even without a Security Council decision. Is Rafah worth it? I don't think so.
No one in the political echelon dares to say what retired generals openly say: it's time to stop, to reach a hostage deal, to calm the north, and start rebuilding the country. Fear of public backlash silences them. It's a show of weakness for those who pretend to be Netanyahu's heirs; I am referring to Benny Gantz and Gadi Eisenkot.
The ICJ proceedings provided them with a golden opportunity: Netanyahu needs them now more than ever. Their stepping down from government will eliminate the remainder of the legitimacy of Netanyahu's government and will mobilize hundreds of thousands in the country. They can regain the influence they lost in recent weeks and dictate moves in Gaza as well as in the negotiations for the release of hostages. Will they know how to seize the opportunity? I don't think so.
Nahum BarneaPhoto: Avigail UziMeanwhile, government officials are spreading half-truths again about the resumption of the hostage negotiations. The Mossad chief traveled and returned, but no deal in sight. Each side is blaming the other; Hamas leader Yahya Sinwar is in no rush, and neither is Netanyahu. Thousands demonstrated on Saturday in Tel Aviv. The masses feel sorrow and anger, despair and anxiety. The protests will intensify in the coming weeks.