The IDF General Staff convened Friday to review the most sensitive investigation into the failures surrounding the October 7 Hamas attacks, focusing on the night leading into the assault.
However, the presentation was only partially completed, addressing intelligence shortcomings but leaving operational issues—such as the actions of the Operations Directorate, Southern Command and the Air Force—unresolved.
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From left: Shin Bet Director Ronen Bar, Defense Minister Israel Katz, Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu and IDF Chief Herzi Halevi
(Photo: GPO)
Tensions surfaced during the session, with senior officers criticizing the exclusion of the Shin Bet security agency from the process. "It’s impossible to investigate the events of October 7 without Shin Bet," a senior IDF official told Ynet.
Shin Bet is primarily responsible for intelligence in Gaza, including the Hamas SIM card monitoring project—a key warning system that failed to signal the impending assault. "We will not finalize this investigation without Shin Bet’s input," the official added.
Key figures scrutinized include IDF Chief of Staff Lt. Gen. Herzi Halevi, Operations Directorate Head Maj. Gen. Oded Basiuk, Southern Command chief Maj. Gen. Yaron Finkelman and then-Military Intelligence chief Maj. Gen. Aharon Haliva, who resigned over the failures.
According to the IDF, responsibility for assessing the events fell largely to the Southern Command’s intelligence officer, who underestimated the attack as a localized raid rather than a full-scale war.
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Discussions also highlighted that Southern Command chief Finkelman arrived at the command center only an hour after the attack began at 6:30 a.m., following an intelligence assessment that did not warrant heightened alert levels.
Chief of Staff Halevi convened a situation assessment at 8 a.m., further delaying the involvement of Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu and then-defense minister Yoav Gallant until the attack was well underway.
The Shin Bet has yet to present its findings, despite holding critical intelligence on Hamas’ shift to emergency protocols, as revealed through SIM card activity. This omission led to inadequate preparedness across IDF units, including Gaza Division forces. Concerns over revealing intelligence sources reportedly constrained Shin Bet’s warnings.
Adding to the challenges, the IDF faces mounting pressure to conclude its broader investigations, including assessments of Southern Command, Gaza Division and specific border communities.
Defense Minister Israel Katz had set a January deadline for completing the probes, but military officials now acknowledge they are unlikely to meet it.