The rapid southward advance of Sunni jihadist rebels and the capture of the city of Hama appear to have prompted the urgent meeting convened Thursday evening by Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu with top security officials.
The rebels' surprise offensive, launched almost immediately after the Lebanon cease-fire took effect, poses a series of potential threats but also offers opportunities for Israel. In any case, the situation requires close monitoring.
Rebel forces enter Hamas, Syria
The most pressing threats are as follows: First, there is a risk that weapons systems, especially missiles and possibly chemical weapons located in northern and central Syria, could fall into rebel hands within days, or even hours. It is possible that some of these are already under jihadist control.
Aleppo, along with the surrounding military bases—particularly the military-industrial complex in the town of al-Safira southeast of Aleppo—represents a significant potential threat.
This industrial complex produces missiles and rockets using Iranian expertise, including precision-guided missiles. It also has the capacity to manufacture chemical weapons, and there may be small quantities of such weapons stored there by Bashar al-Assad’s regime as a contingency measure.
This likely explains reports, according to foreign sources, of Israeli airstrikes in recent days, including Tuesday night into Wednesday, targeting the complex as well as Syrian military weapons depots north of Damascus, which the rebels are rapidly approaching.
It can be assumed that Israel prefers to destroy these threats to prevent conventional and unconventional weaponry from falling into jihadist hands, even if these groups are Sunni and fierce enemies of Hezbollah and Iran.
The second threat stems directly from the Syrian regime army's weakness and Russia's diminished ability to defend Assad's regime, as it did in 2015.
During the height of the Syrian civil war, according to Turkish sources, Russia deployed 50 strike aircraft at its Khmeimim Air Base, which it used to relentlessly bomb rebel positions until they retreated to Idlib province.
However, these sources now claim that due to the war in Ukraine, Russia has only 15 strike aircraft stationed at Khmeimim, with just seven of them operational.
Iran sends fighters, so far without success
In any case, Russian airstrikes failed to prevent the fall of Aleppo and delayed the capture of Hama, in central Syria, by less than a day. Due to the weakness of the Syrian army and limited Russian operational support, Assad's regime has no choice but to accept the assistance offered by Iranian Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi, who visited Damascus just days ago.
Iran has already deployed a general who commanded the recapture of Aleppo from the rebels in 2016, along with several advisors and members of the Revolutionary Guards who accompanied him.
Additionally, Iran has sent Shiite militias from Iraq and Syria that are loyal to its regime. Among these forces is the Fatemiyoun Brigade, primarily composed of Afghan and Pakistani Shiites whose salaries are paid by Iran and who are commanded by the Revolutionary Guards.
This brigade has already entered the battle to defend Hama but failed. Nevertheless, Iran continues to funnel more and more Shiite militia forces from the Iraq-Syria border into the combat zone. Iran has also demanded and received several hundred Hezbollah fighters who have been redeployed from Lebanon to Syria to assist Assad’s regime—so far, without success.
Israel is concerned about these militias and the Hezbollah forces entering Syria, as they could signify the beginning of a long-term Iranian military presence in the country through its proxies. These militias may remain in Syria, with Iran positioning them along the border with Israel. Moreover, they could launch attacks from Syrian territory, including rocket and missile strikes or ground infiltrations into Golan Heights communities.
The possibility that the Assad regime’s weakness will allow Iranian-aligned militias to establish a military presence in Syria, potentially along Israel’s border and facilitating arms smuggling into Lebanon to rearm Hezbollah, is Israel’s primary concern under the current circumstances.
A third threat is the potential collapse of Assad’s regime, which could turn Syria into another failed state akin to Yemen, Lebanon or Gaza, with Iran building and funding a terror army to operate against Israel.
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A "Somalization" of Syria, involving both Sunni and Shiite jihadist forces along Israel’s border, poses a significant threat to communities in the Golan Heights and eastern Galilee.
To counter such a scenario resulting from Assad’s potential collapse, Israel must bolster its defensive measures in the Golan Heights and conduct relentless strikes within Syria. This would aim to prevent extremist Islamist forces from both Sunni and Shiite factions from establishing themselves near Israel’s border and within rocket and mortar range.
A two-front offensive: Erdoğan's strategy
To understand the situation unfolding in the Middle East following the surprise offensive by Syrian rebels, one must recognize Turkey's role in orchestrating the attack. The assault operates on two fronts, driven by Ankara’s strategic interests.
The Islamist jihadist umbrella organization Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS) is advancing southward with the goal of toppling Bashar al-Assad's regime. Their immediate target is the city of Homs, a significant and strategic urban center in central Syria. Capturing Homs would effectively sever Damascus from the Alawite enclave, home to much of Assad’s family in Latakia and Tartus.
Meanwhile, a second rebel faction, the secular Syrian National Army (SNA), is moving eastward toward the cities and villages of the autonomous Kurdish region of Rojava in northeastern Syria. Composed primarily of Sunni defectors from the Syrian military, the SNA operates entirely under Turkish command, effectively acting as an extension of President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan's policies.
The rebel offensive would not have been possible without Turkey's direct military support for both factions. Ankara is leveraging these groups to advance its interests in Syria, which are substantial.
First and foremost, Erdoğan aims to dismantle the Kurdish autonomous region in northern and eastern Syria, which he believes is controlled by the PKK (Kurdistan Workers' Party), a Kurdish insurgent group fighting for independence in Turkey. Turkey seeks to militarily and administratively dismantle these Kurdish organizations, which it views as a direct threat to its territorial integrity.
The jihadist rebels moving southward toward Damascus serve a different purpose for Erdoğan: pressuring Assad to agree to Turkey’s demands. These include establishing a security zone against the Kurds in northern Syria, restoring economic and neighborly relations with Turkey and repatriating over two million Syrian refugees who fled to Turkey during the civil war.
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Bashar al-Assad and Recep Tayyip Erdoğan
(Photo: AP Photo/Ghaith Alsayed, Saudi Press Agency/Handout via REUTERS, Sean Gallup/Getty Images)
Assad, however, has rejected these demands outright. He refuses to normalize relations with Turkey, allow the return of refugees or permit Turkey to establish a security zone within Syria's sovereign territory. In response, Erdoğan is using the jihadist rebels as leverage, much like how Iran utilizes Palestinian Islamic Jihad and supports Hamas in Gaza. Similarly, Turkey employs its proxies: the Syrian National Army, which operates under Erdoğan’s direct command, and the jihadist rebels, who receive Turkish support.
Assad must decide: Whom does he fear more
This web of interests also presents an opportunity for Israel, as a weakened Assad will ultimately have to decide whom he fears more. If he fears the rebels, he might accept aid from Iran and Hezbollah, allowing them to transfer weapons and production tools through Syria to rebuild Hezbollah.
Alternatively, if he fears Israel more, he may refrain from permitting an Iranian presence, knowing Israel will strike any attempts at entrenchment, further weakening his regime. It is likely that the IDF will target any initial signs of Iranian establishment soon. Additional measures are expected to make it harder for Sunni jihadist rebels to establish themselves too close to Israeli communities in the Golan Heights.
If Assad’s regime collapses entirely, it would create a completely new situation requiring reassessment. However, as things stand, Turkey does not appear to want Assad’s regime to collapse entirely. Erdoğan is aware that ungoverned chaos and internal sectarian battles ultimately pose a threat to Turkey, just as they do to Israel.
Therefore, Erdoğan likely has an interest in seeing Assad retain control over two small enclaves: one around Damascus and the other around Latakia and Tartus. From these limited areas, Assad would pose little threat to either Turkey or Israel.
Erdoğan’s situation with the Kurds is no less complicated. The Kurds in the autonomous region they established in northern and eastern Syria are allies of the United States, which maintains 900 troops there.
While former President Donald Trump previously expressed a desire to withdraw those forces, his military advisers convinced him otherwise. It remains unclear what Trump will decide when he returns to office and whether he will leave the Kurds at Erdoğan’s mercy.