Extreme caution is required when it comes to Hamas military leader Mohammed Deif. Nonetheless, barring an extraordinary miracle for the arch-terrorist, Deif – or by his full name, Mohammed Diab Ibrahim al-Masri (Abu Khaled) – was killed in the Israeli strike in the Al-Mawasi area on Saturday morning.
The intelligence on his location was precise, and the likelihood of him surviving such an attack is nearly nonexistent. Therefore, it can be surmised that Deif – whose bodyguards have already been identified as casualties – is no longer among the living.
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Hamas leader in Gaza Yahya Sinwar and ]military leader Mohammed Deif
(Photo: EPA, IDF Spokesperson's Unit)
The national security establishment must, of course, be more cautious than the media, and without 100% confirmation, it refrains from definitively declaring his death – especially given that Deif has survived seven previous Israeli assassination attempts.
The strike on Deif and Khan Younis Brigade Commander Rafa Salama occurred when Hamas was at its lowest point militarily since the beginning of the war. While this is not yet a breaking point, and we are unlikely to see Hamas leader in Gaza Yahya Sinwar emerging from a tunnel waving a white flag anytime soon, there is no doubt that the organization's military wing has faced significant dramatic events in recent weeks. These events have brought it to its weakest point since the coup in June 2007 that brought it to power in Gaza.
Firstly, Hamas' tunnel network is suffering increasingly significant damage with each passing day. There is a clear reason why Deif, Hamas' most wanted man, chose to come above ground and move to that safe house in the Al-Mawasi area.
Deif's health condition might have made it difficult for him to stay in the tunnels, but it is also likely that he was forced to act in a way that proved to be a critical mistake due to the IDF's reach into many strategic tunnels.
The IDF's control over the Philadelphi Corridor and the Rafah crossing deprives Hamas of a strategic asset. In the past, the tunnels were primarily used to smuggle weapons into the Palestinian enclave, and the Rafah crossing held significant economic benefits
He might have also thought that his presence among hundreds of uninvolved civilians would grant him immunity from attack. Ultimately, Deif and Salama made the mistake of abandoning the tunnels.
Secondly, Hamas' rocket arsenal is depleting. According to the IDF, Hamas still possesses long-range rockets capable of reaching Tel Aviv and Jerusalem, but it is uncertain whether it can launch them. It is highly likely that if Hamas had such launch capability after the assassination of its chief of staff, it would have tried to demonstrate its ability to carry out significant rocket fire. It is also likely that Hamas is saving rockets for a moment just before a cease-fire. However, if it had enough rockets and the ability to launch them, it would have done so.
Thirdly, the IDF's control over the Philadelphi Corridor and the Rafah crossing deprives Hamas of a strategic asset. In the past, the tunnels were primarily used to smuggle weapons into the Palestinian enclave, and the Rafah crossing held significant economic benefits.
Fourthly, the organization's fighting force has sustained heavy losses. According to IDF estimates, approximately 14,000 Hamas terrorists have been killed or captured. Adding the number of wounded fighters who have become incapacitated, it easily accounts for more than half of Hamas' fighting force, estimated at around 30,000 fighters.
This also presents an opportunity to finalize a hostage deal, particularly as Hamas needs a cease-fire more than ever – as long as the hostages can be brought home alive
Additionally, another significant reason that underscores the weakness of the military wing is the elimination or disappearance of most of its senior leadership. From company commanders to brigade commanders, and notably two of the top four leaders, Marwan Issa and Deif, who were likely killed. Yahya Sinwar now finds himself with a completely different general staff than the one that started the war on October 7, having lost his closest allies.
Equally important are the signs of public discontent among Gazans toward the war. Some are furious with Hamas and openly express their discontent with the organization's leaders, who found shelter in tunnels while other Gazans remain unprotected. Hamas is aware of these sentiments, which is likely a major reason it has continued talks regarding a hostage deal instead of halting them.
However, it is important to caution that Hamas will not break and surrender soon. Its operatives will continue to fire at IDF soldiers and attempt to harm them as much as possible. While these incidents will become less frequent, they will not disappear entirely. There will be no "total victory" that forces Hamas and its members to surrender their weapons and capitulate, but there may already be significant achievements in the fight against the terrorist organization. This also presents an opportunity to finalize a hostage deal, particularly as Hamas needs a cease-fire more than ever – as long as the hostages can be brought home alive.