Security forces operating in Jenin
(Video: IDF Spokesperson's Unit)
The IDF’s operation in the Jenin refugee camp was preceded by a long period of preparation, including briefings by senior political and security officials.
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They spoke of a "major operation in Jenin," and some even compared the activity to Operation Defensive Shield during the second Intifada.
Precisely because of this, it is better to contextualize the current operation appropriately. Anyone who equates the current operation with Operation Defensive Shield is making a fool of themselves.
By the way, even the operation’s initial airstrike wasn’t an exceptional success, to say the least. With all due respect for eliminating one terrorist in the joint command headquarters of terror organizations, the IDF has already experienced more successful opening strikes than this.
The deterioration in the Jenin refugee camp actually began with the outbreak of COVID-19. The Palestinian Authority distanced itself from the area to the point of complete detachment from knowing what was going on.
The Palestinian Authority never had a firm grip there, but its weakness turned into a loss of control. Therefore, it is also important to note that we don’t see a similar situation in other cities in the West Bank, which is one of the reasons why we are currently far from an intifada, and likewise far from an operation approaching the scale of Operation Defensive Shield.
Security forces, backed by the Israeli government and under international pressure, did everything they could to allow Palestinian Authority mechanisms to return to Jenin and maintain law and order within the chaos.
Nevertheless, it’s justified to criticize Israel’s policy because it’s the one that turned the camp into a fortified, isolated target that attracts terrorists, weapons caches and other means of combat – and enjoys financial and ideological support from terrorist organizations in Gaza to Iran.
The first ones to suffer from the deteriorating situation today are Jenin’s own residents. These are 40,000 Palestinian who were taken in the past two years as hostages by militants and terrorists.
The city, which until 2020 was one of the leading centers of economy and trade in the West Bank, has been suffering a continuous decline in trade volume, especially in relations with Arab-Israelis, who are worried about entering the city out of fear of running into armed clashes.
In 2019, more than a million Arab-Israeli vehicles entered the city, leaving over 1.5 billion shekels in purchases. Today, the numbers are barely reaching 3,000.
But the Jenin refugee camp’s destructive tendencies don’t end at its borders alone. A series of terror attacks originating from the camp, mainly shooting attacks, have claimed the lives of dozens of innocent Israelis.
Some of the attackers are local residents, some fled there, and some received guidance and weapons in the camp. This is a reality that Israel can’t tolerate.
Security officials estimated that a large cache of weapons, including illegal weapons and rockets, would be found after forces entered the camp. However, at the time of writing, no extraordinary amount of military equipment or weapons has been found, though a large amount have been found.
Therefore, despite Israel scrambling together an operation for several months, with heavy planning by IDF special forces, Shin Bet, and the Air Force, it seems that we’re in the final stages of a focused counterterrorism act. This isn’t anything like Operation Defensive Shield.
The coming hours are critical for this operation. First, we should hope the IDF will maintain its current achievements and conclude it with a clear upper hand - without losses among Israeli forces and without unneeded escalation.
As for a solution for Jenin, the IDF needs to do more. A single operation, no matter how successful, won’t turn the camp and its residents into Israel supporters.
But it’s possible and necessary to replicate and adapt the model that was used in Operation Determined Path in June 2002, following Defensive Shield, to suppress terror attacks that hit Israel during the Second Intifada.
The IDF should focus on the camp and carry out daily operations against terror. In addition, military effort alone isn’t enough, we need to combine military capabilities with civil ones, that will deter the Palestinian public from giving a hand to terror and criminal activity.
In conclusion, call the operation what you will, but the important thing is to finish it on time and return back safely, however many times it takes for us to win.
First published: 00:19, 07.04.23