The upcoming Doha summit, if it proceeds, is unlikely to achieve a significant breakthrough. As of now, there is no certainty that Hamas representatives will attend the summit. Reports surfaced Wednesday suggesting that senior Hamas officials have decided not to participate, effectively reducing the event to a one-sided meeting. Even if Hamas does attend, the chances of success remain slim.
The likelihood of a meaningful outcome is low, largely due to Iran's so-called "ultimatum." Tehran has issued statements threatening to attack Israel if the Doha negotiations fail to produce results, setting the summit up for failure.
Hamas, seeking regional escalation to distract the IDF, may aim to sabotage the summit in hopes of sparking the broader conflict it has been unable to ignite since the war began. This scenario has been Hamas leader Yahya Sinwar’s goal since October 7, but his attempts to trigger a regional war have so far failed.
Adding to the challenges are the obstacles from the Israeli side, particularly from Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, who, despite denials from his office, has introduced additional conditions and barriers to the hostage negotiations. These hurdles further diminish the already low chances of success at the summit.
If there are no last-minute surprises, the region could soon find itself on the brink of potential conflict, with Iran issuing endless threats to strike Israel from multiple fronts.
However, it's important to temper these concerns. Neither Hezbollah nor Iran has a genuine interest in a full-scale regional war, despite recent high-profile assassinations, including that of former Hamas political leader Ismail Haniyeh in Tehran and Hezbollah military chief Fuad Shukr in Beirut's Dahieh district. Unlike Sinwar, who was willing to sacrifice Gaza for his ambitions, Iran’s leaders are unlikely to risk their country’s economy for revenge.
On the back burner
Both Iran and Hezbollah stand to lose significantly in a full-scale conflict. Iran, in particular, could see its oil industry damaged and its nuclear program become a primary target for Israeli and American strikes.
Avi IssacharoffPhoto: Yuval ChenSimilarly, Hezbollah and its leader, Hassan Nasrallah, have much to lose. Most of the Lebanese public are deeply critical of Hezbollah and oppose any war with Israel. While Lebanon’s public opinion may not be Hezbollah’s primary concern, the group is keenly aware of Israel’s improved intelligence capabilities, as demonstrated by the recent assassination of Fuad Shukr. Nasrallah knows that initiating a major war with Israel would come at a steep price.
Given these factors, the likelihood of a major escalation remains low if the parties act rationally. However, two significant points must be considered: first, there is no certainty that all players will adhere to the expected rules of engagement. Second, even a limited response from Iran or Hezbollah could result in civilian casualties if a missile or rocket strikes Israel. Such an incident would compel Israel to retaliate, potentially escalating the conflict further.