All this is true on condition that it is clear to both Hamas and Egypt that the Israeli government is still determined to link the lifting of the Gaza siege to Gilad Shalit’s release, that our frantic government would not be falling in love with the quiet created by the ceasefire, and that our government be willing to make use of the cards it holds until the cruel poker game ends.
The above assessment is premised on the following facts:
1. Israel’s acceptance of the ceasefire led to the establishment of a new and more efficient mechanism for negotiations on Shalit’s release. Instead of lazily relaying messages between Gaza and Jerusalem via the Egyptians, as was the case thus far, in the coming days we will see the start of intensive talks in Cairo between Israeli and Hamas teams. The Egyptian mediator will go between the hotels or rooms where the two delegations sit and relay proposals and counter-offers, with President Mubarak monitoring the situation and exerting pressure behind the scenes.
2. Another encouraging fact is Hamas’ declared willingness to show more flexibility at this time. The organization claims that there is no connection between the negotiations on Shalit’s release and the lull, yet the leader of Hamas’ radical branch in Gaza, Mahmoud al-Zahar, explicitly said in an interview with Israel Radio that the group is willing to embark on renewed discussion of all contentious issues. The fact that al-Zahar, who is a true extremist, agreed to submit to an interview on an Israeli radio station is encouraging in and of itself. There is also talk of the format of the prisoner swap, which has already been finalized, being modified in a way that would make it easier for both sides to reach agreement.
3. We should also recognize the fact that opening the crossings used to transfer goods from Israel to the Strip creates expectations and a sense of hope among Gaza residents. This atmosphere turns the opening of the crossings into an asset that Hamas does not wish to lose. This is particularly true should the organization be portrayed on the Palestinian street as the one that prompted the loss of hope and normalization, and the inability to make a living in the Strip. The major interest Hamas has in the truce agreement stems from the group leaders’ fears regarding the possibility of losing popular support because of the economic distress.
Gazans don’t want another siege
Should Israel see that the Hamas negotiations team fails to show flexibility on Shalit, Israel can backtrack and retighten the siege. It I easy to predict the reaction of Gaza residents, who are already starting to enjoy the lifting of the siege, should the economic chokehold be reintroduced. Chances are that Hamas would respond to such Israeli move by renewing the fire.
We should be ready for this, and even for the possibility that the fire will be resumed for a short while and then, once Hamas sees that Israel is not yielding, it would agree to renew the truce in exchange for further flexibility on the prisoner release issue. However, this time around, should the rocket and mortar fire be resumed, southern residents will know that their suffering does not stem from the political and moral weakness of their government, but rather, they will see that the government is determined to rescue a soldier that was taken captive and the IDF is willing to fight for him. Their sacrifice will be made for the sake of a worthy cause and the government’s ability to deter our enemies against future abductions would be reinforced.
All of that will happen on condition that the government will decide, and declare so clearly, that Gilad Shalit’s release is a condition for continuing the truce and lifting the siege. We should be declaring now already, to international public opinion and to the Israeli public, that the opening of the crossings with Gilad Shalit still in captivity is an Israeli gesture meant to grant the last opportunity for trading the Israeli captive in exchange for Palestinian detainees through dialogue rather than bullets.
This way, Israel would prove that it is willing to relinquish its interest and allow Hamas to grow stronger, yet it is unwilling to give up on our captive. Therefore, nobody would be able to condemn the Israeli government should it decide to backtrack on its decision to open the crossings because of Hamas stubbornness on Shalit. Even if the move ultimately fails, Prime Minister Olmert and Defense Minister Barak would be able to look into the eyes of the Shalit family, the Israeli public, and the ministers and tell them that we tried everything – the only option left now is to resort to force.