Giora Eiland
Photo: Ofer Amram
Lessons we need to learn
Shalit swap talks should have been part of broader negotiation process
Regardless of the ultimate decision to be taken by the Israeli government in respect to the Shalit deal, it appears that two lessons should be understood at this time already.
I am not talking about the decision to establish a committee that is supposed to define criteria for future swaps. I doubt whether it is possible to come up with accurate criteria that will be relevant and applicable to any future case. The two lessons have to do with broader questions. The first pertains to the scope of negotiations, while the second pertains to decision-making.
Any negotiations that will take place in the future in respect to prisoner swaps between Israel and its enemies can be expected to push Israel into an inferior position. This is an issue where we are more vulnerable to pressure than our enemies; we are greatly affected by public opinion as well as pressure exerted by captives’ families, thereby engaging in talks with media transparency that assists the other side.
For that reason, it is always better to engage in negotiations over such issues in the framework of a broader process, which also pertains to other matters where our enemies face as much pressure.
During Operation Cast Lead, Israel had an opportunity to combine a prisoner swap within a broader agreement. Israel could have argued from day one of the operation that its completion will include three issues: A mutual ceasefire, the opening of Gaza Strip crossings, and a prisoner swap (with the latter two presented as humanitarian issues.)
As Hamas was under greater pressure than us to reach a ceasefire and faced much greater pressure to ensure that the crossings open for the transfers of goods, we could have likely secured a more convenient formula on the third issue of a prisoner swap. Giving up on a “comprehensive deal” was a grave mistake.
Convincing explanations
For substantive reasons, and also for reasons of domestic politics, it is usually better to engage in negotiations over a broad issue, which enables a greater extent of give-and-take. The greater the scope, the easier it is for the leaders on both sides to present “convincing explanations” for why they conceded on issue A in order to get more on issue B.Nine months ago we saw the establishment of a new government in Israel. This political change also allowed our elected leaders to adopt significant changes in policy compared to their predecessors. The “real” discussion that Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu should have held in respect to the Shalit deal should have taken place back then, not now.
Not only was it an opportunity to reexamine the various possibilities, but Hamas would have been forced to realize that the new government will not necessarily agree to everything the previous government agreed to. Yet this was not done.
And so, Bibi stepped into Olmert’s shoes, and mediator Hagai Hadas stepped into Ofer Dekel’s shoes. The moment the negotiations were renewed that way, it was clear that they will prompt similar results to the ones offered to the previous government.
What was lacking back then, and is lacking in similar cases, is a principled discussion before negotiations get underway. The moment we allow our negotiators to go ahead without first deciding on the government’s principled positions, we allow the talks to develop into a specific proposal, and once the government convenes to debate it there are only two choices left: Either approve the only proposal out there, or create a confidence crisis vis-à-vis the other side, the mediator, public opinion, etc.
This syndrome is relevant not only to negotiations on a prisoner swap, but also to many other political issues. If we recall how the Oslo Accords were approved, we would see that the process back then was similar.
