Cast Lead got job done
Op-ed: Gaza Strip war produced effective deterrence vis-à-vis Hamas at reasonable price
Part 2 of article
In the lengthy discussions ahead of Operation Cast Lead, Defense Minister Ehud Barak and Army Chief Gabi Ashkenazi managed to convince Prime Minister Ehud Olmert and the cabinet to adopt their doctrine and the limited format they proposed. Olmert claims that he was forced to give in because he couldn’t – politically and personally, especially in the wake of the Second Lebanon War –order the IDF to operate in contradiction of the defense minister’s and chief of staff’s view. Hence, the cabinet decided that Cast Lead will focus on the northern section of the Gaza Strip, including Gaza City and the refugee camps on its outskirts.
Part 1
Ron Ben-Yishai
Op-ed: Operation Cast Lead highlighted clash between ‘Olmert doctrine’ and ‘Barak doctrine’
The operation was to get underway with an aerial strike to continue for several days. This blow was meant to produce a “shock and awe” effect in the Strip, inspired by the American opening shot in Saddam Hussein’s Iraq in 2003. Following the aerial attack, assuming no unexpected developments, the cabinet was to approve the IDF’s ground incursion. This phase was to include a siege around Gaza City, attacks on Hamas strongholds at its outskirts, and detaching the northern Strip from its southern section. Simultaneously, the cabinet was to approve IDF reserve call-ups, including armored and infantry forces trained and ready to take part in the operation.
The success enjoyed by the IDF in the first phases of the operation affected the Barak and Olmert camps in an opposite manner: Olmert developed a greater appetite, while Barak, along with Ashkenazi, wanted to end the campaign and get out of Gaza as soon as possible. Olmert wanted the IDF to utilize the 60,000 reservists whose call-up was approved by the cabinet in order to proceed to the next steps on the drawing board: Expand the operation into Gaza City as well as other parts of the Strip and the Philadelphi Route.
The way the fighting developed proved to him, as he told his close associates, that Barak’s “scaremongering” was baseless and that there’s a genuine chance to topple Hamas should the operation be extended by a few more weeks. This was the impression the former prime minister got from field commanders while visiting the division headquarters during the ground incursion. It’s unclear whether then-Southern Command Chief Yoav Galant was among those who created this impression.
On the other hand, Barak and Ashkenazi reached the conclusion that Cast Lead fully secured its objectives a short while after the ground incursion got underway and some two weeks after the operation was launched. Barak estimated that the aerial campaign alone produced most of the required effect needed to deter Hamas. Hence, he and Army Chief Ashkenazi decided – after consulting Southern Command Chief Galant – not to call up the 60,000 reservists, but rather, only the 20,000 needed in order to complete the operation in its original format.
Olmert claims that Barak proposed that the IDF be pulled out of the Strip 48 hours after the ground incursion got underway, in order to prevent needless friction between the IDF and the civilian population. The army chief held similar views. Hence, Barak started to seek a way to end the operation in a manner that would reinforce its achievements, whether through understandings with Hamas via the Egyptians, or by declaring a ceasefire in complying with the French foreign minister’s call for a 72-hour “humanitarian ceasefire.”
Olmert was furious. He received a phone call from French President Sarkozy, who urged him to accept “Barak’s offer” and therefore claims that the defense minister was the one who initiated the demand for a 72-hour “humanitarian ceasefire,” after which it would be difficult to resume and expand the fighting. Yet Barak claims that France initiated the proposal.
Olmert reprimanded Barak for acting behind his back and the defense minister, according to Olmert’s associates, apologized and promised this won’t repeat. Ultimately, Olmert and the cabinet rejected the “French initiative” and the operation continued, although not in line with the plan desired by Olmert. Instead, the troops mostly stayed in place, until eventually understandings were reached with Egyptian mediation, allowing the IDF to withdraw from the Strip.
Creative solution to dilemma
“It’s clear to me that we missed an opportunity,” ex-PM Olmert told Ynet. He said that had the operation continued, Hamas’ rule in Gaza would have been toppled. “Had we continued for a few more weeks, the Strip would have collapsed and we could have created a reality that would wholly change the situation in Gaza and enable the return of the Palestinian Authority’s rule.”
Olmert also claims that the price paid by the IDF and State of Israel in terms of casualties, economically, and in the global arena had his doctrine been adopted would have been much smaller than the estimates of Barak, who Olmert said tried to “terrify” him and the government in order to cut the operation short. Olmert himself had to toe the line with Barak’s doctrine to avoid accusations that he was taking advantage of the extended operation in order to stay in place as PM and put off the elections.
However, the operation’s outcome reinforced the Barak-Ashkenazi doctrine. Operation Cast Lead achieved effective deterrence vis-à-vis Hamas, and others. The capabilities displayed by the IDF in the Strip erased to a large extent the difficult impression left by the Second Lebanon War. Mostly, deterring Hamas granted Gaza-region residents two years of relative quiet and unprecedented economic prosperity.
There’s a good chance that this lull will continue for some time, even though some escalations will materialize here and there. Every quiet day that passes is a net gain for Israel. On the other hand, the friction between IDF forces and Gaza’s civilian population, which was rather minimal during the operation, prompted the Goldstone Report while its aftermath led Israel into an open conflict with Turkey. It’s easy to assume what would have happened had the IDF remained in the Strip for a few more weeks or longer, as Olmert wanted.
Meanwhile, Hamas acquired more rockets and anti-tank weapons, yet not in an accelerated manner and not in a way that threatens the IDF’s ability to again operate in the Strip. A cost-benefit analysis makes it appear that Operation Cast Lead enabled the IDF to secure its targets at a reasonable price.
The burning question now is what Israel will do next time, once the deterrence vis-à-vis Hamas fully collapses. The fact that the IDF is ready to again enter the Strip does not guarantee the next operation’s success, especially on the diplomatic front.
Even if Hamas fires dozens of rockets and mortar shells at the Negev, it’s hard to believe that the international community would allow Israel to improve its showing in Gaza in line with Olmert’s doctrine. The minimalistic “deterrence levers” doctrine espoused by Barak may also act as a boomerang against us while the Israeli government is seen globally as a serial peace refusenik, with Turkey – which shows great sensitivity to Gaza affairs – threatening to turn into an openly declared enemy.
Under such circumstances, it’s hard to see Israel embarking on yet another Operation Cast Lead in the Strip. Indeed, Netanyahu, Barak, and the IDF under Yoav Galant’s leadership will have to come up with a new, creative solution for this dilemma.
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