Before reporting to military reserve duty, Refael Kauders and his wife Judith went on a weekend to celebrate their wedding anniversary. They had a lot to celebrate: four lovely children, a house in Tzur Hadassah, great love. The 39-year-old Kauders, who served as religion and tradition coordinator of the 5030th Infantry Battalion, did not have to report to reserves duty, but he was determined to contribute his share.
Upon his return from the weekend, Kauders set out for the Druze town of Hurfeish, where he and his fellow reservists in the infantry battalion were busy setting up the camp, near a soccer field. Some soldiers in the battalion thought it was dangerous to set up a camp in such an exposed area, near the Lebanon border, arguing that "staying there endangers the lives of dozens of soldiers", but the location of the camp was not changed.
On Wednesday, June 5, afternoon, Hezbollah experimented with a new method of attack, launching two suicide drones toward the Horfeish area in the upper Galilee. It is not clear yet whether Hezbollah had advance information on the whereabouts of the soldiers, or if the drone operators were simply looking for targets and found them. Either way, the crossing of the drones was not identified, and no warning alarm was triggered. One drone exploded on the soccer field, and the second continued to hover in the air for a few more minutes, waiting for rescue forces to rush to the scene of the first explosion, and then it exploded as well.
Staff Sergeant (res.) Kauders was killed, and 12 were injured, including a female soldier who was seriously injured. "We felt like ducks on a shooting range," said a reservist from the battalion who survived the attack. The UAVs again took a bloody toll.
The IDF announced that a thorough investigation will be carried out and lessons will be learned, but Hizki Bezalel, the brother-in-law of the late Kauders is troubled. Since the disaster, he began to explore UAVs, trying to understand why Israel was not able to deal with them. "It upsets me that a device that costs about $2,000 causes us more trouble than all the expensive weapons, and we continue to get equipped with F-35 and the Air Force refuses to listen," he said this week. "The army is reluctant to consider a cheap solution. Instead, they prefer to develop expensive and sophisticated weapons. The problem is that senior military officials are unwilling to consider non-prestigious solutions. After all, no F-35 can handle a strike of a hundred UAVs launched simultaneously. We are not angry, we just want them to learn a lesson. They should conclude and understand that reality has changed. They just need to understand how the UAVs work, and whether there are solutions available. To this day our case has not been investigated."
Since October 7, Hezbollah alone has launched about 2,000 unmanned aerial vehicles into Israeli territory. Iran, the Houthis, and the Shiite militias in both Syria and Iraq are also trying to send UAVs. There are no official figures on how many of them hit their targets, but at least eight Israelis were killed in drone attacks and many dozens were injured. The property damage cannot yet be estimated, and it is certainly impossible to set a price tag for all the times that drones urged Israelis to run for shelter or disrupted the course of their life.
The late Mikhail Samara from Kafr Yasif was the last person killed (until the publication of this article) by a Hezbollah drone, as he was hit by an IDF intercepting rocket that missed the drone in the Nahariya area. In the same Hezbollah drone attack, 19 people were injured, including six soldiers. Before Samara, drones also claimed the lives of the late Yevgeny Ferder, who was killed by a Houthi drone strike that hit his apartment in Tel Aviv; the late Major Dor Zimel, who was killed by a drone strike on a building in Arab al-Aramshe, where his department stayed; Command Sergeant Major (Res.) Yehezkel Azaria, who was killed by a hit near Margaliot community in the north; Major (Res.) Dan Kamhaji, and Staff-Sergeant-Major (Res.) Nachman Nathan Hertz who was killed by a hit near Metula; and Master Sergeant (Res.) Valeri Chefonov, who was killed by a drone attack on Kibbutz Kabri.
While the Iron Dome systems, David's Sling, and the Arrow missiles provide broad protection - although it is not airtight - a small, slow, often unsophisticated vehicle has become a major threat, especially in the north. Indications that UAVs were becoming a weapon that must be addressed were here long before the October 7 massacre. Why didn't it happen? As usual, it depends on who you ask. The bottom line, Israel's security system is trying while under fire to find solutions for that threat.
"The professional challenge is great, but it had to be prioritized"
UAV (Unmanned Aerial Vehicle) is a general name for all aircraft that do not include a human pilot onboard. Some drones can be purchased cheaply online and armed, and there are larger drones, such as Hermes and Eitan, operated by the Israeli Air Force or the Americans.
The benefits of the UAVs are clear: they are usually smaller, cheaper, and simpler to operate than a fighter aircraft; they can be easily adapted to a variety of purposes, and the simpler models do not require a complicated operation, or complex technical setup, airports, or pilots. Having a good and advanced air force is complicated and can be maintained by wealthy countries that have technological capabilities. In contrast, UAVs have also allowed terrorist organizations to establish their aerial threats.
Hezbollah began using Iranian-made UAVs in the early 2000s. Their first attack was modest: almost 20 years ago, in November 2004, Hezbollah's first UAV entered Israel's airspace without being detected, hovered for several minutes above Nahariya in the north, turned to the sea, and then fell. Over the years, there were more infiltrations by Hezbollah drones, also in the Second Lebanon War in 2006, but they were usually intercepted. In the meantime, Hezbollah accumulated more and more Iranian drones of various types and established a special drone division, called Unit 127, which engaged in developing their flying capabilities. Israel followed these developments closely, sand sometimes reacted - in December 2022 Israel bombed Uthe nit 127 facility in Lebanon, for example - but somehow, Israel underestimated the potential of the threat. Among the mass of urgent tasks in the north, such as combating Hezbollah's missile precision project and preventing Iranian entrenchment in Syria, the UAVs were not Israel's top priority. This was, of course, a mistake.
The war that is taking place in Ukraine, almost 2,000 km from here, should have been a warning signal. At the beginning of last year, Russia and Iran signed a huge deal for the purchase of UAVs. Iran has supplied Russia with drones "Shahed 131" and "Shahed 136", both suicide drones, which are a cheap alternative to the expensive Russian missiles, which have been running out. These are relatively 'dumb' aircraft, but the Ukrainians learned very quickly how deadly they were.
Hezbollah is also equipped with these two types of "Shahed", in addition to several other types of drones. The terrorist organization currently uses mainly suicide drones and intelligence-gathering drones and recently released videos documenting drone flights over Haifa port and onsite security facility in Haifa Bay.
Moreover, Hezbollah also has Iranian attack drones of the "Karar" type ", which can carry bombs or missiles, launch them, and return to their base, or launch them and then crash themselves on the target. The Iranian attacking drones do not have the sophistication and accuracy of Israel's UAVs, and still, if Hezbollah decides to use them, it could cause great damage.
"The fact that we reached October 7 without an adequate response to the threat of UAVs is a failure of the Ministry of Defense along with the air defense system," says a source familiar with the UAV world. "They should have seen what was happening in Ukraine and adapted it to the Israeli reality. We did not react quickly enough to the threat. One could have realized that once the Russians used it in Ukraine, bearing in mind that the Iranians are their allies, at some point, it will reach us - and we should have created a response to it. Unfortunately, it did not happen."
Why not?
"Officials I talk to claim that budgetary constraints forced them to equip with less good systems, especially radar systems. The sooner UAVs are identified, the chances are to intercept them. Currently, IAI's radar production time is long. The second problem is that some of the existing radars are positioned at high altitudes aimed to detect missiles, but UAVs fly at a different angle relative to the radar system. The Iron Dome, for example, underwent adjustments for UAVs and improved its detection capabilities, but it does not provide an airtight solution. The third point is that Israel is currently facing many fronts, about seven. And still, this is not the security system's biggest nightmare."
What is its biggest nightmare?
"A 'swarm' drone attack. It could cause damage to air force bases and strategic facilities."
Brigadier General Ran Kochav, former commander of the air defense system between 2018-2021, admits that "the Israeli Air Force has determined that UAVs were not an existential threat, and therefore was a second priority," but he also states that "I'm not sorry about that."
Why?
"Because it was necessary to prioritize. The aerial defense is not perfect, but on April 14 (the night of the first Iranian attack) and in October, the defense was excellent. UAVs pose a great challenge. There are many types of drones: fuel-powered, electric-powered, remotely controlled, one-way drones, such as suicide UAVs, attacking drones, and drones used for taking pictures.
A UAV that flies from Iran is not similar to a drone that flies from Marjayoun in south Lebanon to Metula in the north of Israel. UAVs are not characterized only by their variety but also by their quantity. They are inexpensive and therefore replaced the rockets.
Our enemy realized that the air defense system can cope well with rockets and missiles, so it began sending swarms of drones."
Quite a few claim that the problem, as seen in the war in Ukraine, was right in front of us, but we failed to realize it was coming our way, and we didn't prepare ourselves
"It's not true that we didn't look at the Russians in Ukraine. Operations teams that studied the war there concluded that it was a challenging threat but not an existential one and that it did a lot of psychological damage, and we had to deal with it.
Technologically speaking it's difficult to handle it because the UAV is very simple. It causes great damage, but it's not scientifically complicated. We were not prepared for UAVs in the Iron Sword war because it wasn't a top priority. We needed to buy another tank, a submarine, and an iron dome, so we prioritized. Imagine what would have happened if we had set a different priority, and instead of thousands of rocket interceptors we had thousands of UAV interceptors - rockets would have killed more. We need both. It generated a perception of the 'absurdity of success'."
What does "absurdity of success" mean?
"Since the success of the Iron Dome, David's Sling and Arrow 2 and 3 systems is so great, an 'absurdity of success' perception is generated. The public praises us for our achievements, but he does not forgive us in terms of the drone attacks, where the success rate was 'only' 75% and not 95%. I hear terms like 'failure', 'scandal' or 'how could this happen?', which do not reflect reality."
Can you talk to me in numbers?
"In this war, the number of rocket and missile interceptions was of 4-digits, and by the time this article is published there will be another 200, these are huge amounts. In terms of UAVs and other flying objects, the interceptions are 3-digits."
"Things keep changing"
The main problem, as mentioned, is that UAVs are difficult to detect. The Israeli radar systems are very advanced, but they know how to detect planes, missiles, and even rockets of a certain size. That's what they were designed for, as this was the main threat. But UAVs, especially the smallest ones, are slow speed, flying at low altitudes deep inside valleys in the Galilee, and since Hezbollah launches them near the border, there is not enough time left to detect them, while they dive toward their targets. Their size is very confusing, and they are also made of a variety of materials. In the first months of the war, there were cases where the Iron Dome radar detected a UAV threat in the north which turned out to be innocent migrating cranes, says an officer involved in the production of radars. "It happened that we shot at flocks of cranes mistakenly identified as aircraft infiltration, and we launched Iron Domes and David's sling interceptors."
"Our main problem is detection because when we don't see, we don't shoot", says Brigadier General (res.) Kochav. "It is difficult to detect UAVs because they fly below the radar and leave a low radar signature. They do not have much metal, so a radar designed to detect an aircraft by its metal, fails to identify the drone, and if you lower the sensitivity of the radar, then many false alarms are triggered. Therefore, the main challenge is detection. It is possible to detect them by observation, or by acoustic radars, as was done in World War II, or using electronic warfare by receiving GPS signals, but it's very difficult", he adds.
"Furthermore, we may detect the drone, but it will be hard to follow it because it flies slowly compared to a rocket or an airplane. And if we've already managed to track it, it's not certain that we'll be able to launch a fighter plane to intercept it, bearing in mind that air defense systems are not deployed everywhere. Besides, we might not even know whose drone it is."
What do you mean?
"If a rocket is launched at you, for example, it must be the enemy's. But how can you tell whom a drone or another flying device belongs to? It might belong to Metula's standby security squad. Moreover, regulation issues also pose a problem. Any child can buy a drone and equip it with explosives. I'm not trying to make excuses. The result is not good enough. We need 100 percent success, but because Iron Dome's success rate is 95% or more, then 75% is not acceptable."
It's maybe 75% now. But what will happen in the event of a swarm attack of dozens, maybe hundreds of UAVs simultaneously launched toward a certain target? Does this sound like an extreme scenario?
"In my view, an extreme scenario would involve a simultaneous attack, by Hezbollah, Syria, Iran, and Yemen, launching both cruise and surface-to-surface missiles and flying devices, using different methods, some electric, some motorized, some armed, some precise. This may sound like a far-fetched scenario, but I can't say 'This will never happen'. There is no perfect airtight defense, and there is no solution available for every scenario. However, our air defense system is one of the best in the world, and if citizens are under attack, they'd better be here than in Beirut, Damascus, or Tehran. Is this an existential threat? No. Also, dozens of drones do not pose an existential threat. It's not good when such an aircraft crashes in Tel Aviv. But let's calm down."
Prof. Daniel Weihs, Head of the Autonomous Systems and Robotics Program at the Technion, has been eating, breathing, and planning drones for 50 years. And yet, he admits that he too only recently realized the potential of the threat. "No one, including me, thought they could use it against us. Only in the last few months did I realize it, as it started to become real and not just an episode."
So, what do we do?
"I know that now they are working frantically to find solutions, including those that I can't disclose. We are a country that has developed drones and UAVs more than any other country, the problem is that we thought we were the only ones doing it, and we did not prepare ourselves for an attack."
In the meantime, the security system does not have a complete solution for UAVs, certainly not at the level of the Iron Dome system. Dr. Liran Antebi, a senior research fellow at the Institute for National Security Studies INSS, believes that it's not just the IDF's responsibility. "After all, the IDF does not budget itself," she says. "There is a great deal of blame on Israel's decision-makers. There were several years when Israel lacked an approved state budget, which made it impossible to build military strength. Today there are excellent systems, but they are not suitable for UAVs."
And meanwhile, time passes.
"The time that has passed between the war in Ukraine, the October 7 massacre, and today, was preparing ourselves better for such a challenge, and we are closing the gap today, while under fire when it could have been done when we were not at war."
The Directorate of Defense, Research, & Development (DDR&D) at the Ministry of Defense, is not worried about looking for "solutions under fire". We work better when we're under pressure. That's the Israeli nature", says an official in DDR&D.
However, it would have been better to find solutions for UAV threats beforehand.
"Over the years, the security system has faced multiple and diverse threats. But things keep changing. The Iron Dome system is constantly improving, because the UAV is also changing in terms of communication, color, and power source; today it runs on fuel and tomorrow it's electric. We have to adjust to these changes. But we have some solutions in store, and we believe we are headed in the right direction."
The quick solution and the open hole
The need for quick solutions to handle UAV threats led the defense establishment to re-use the old Vulcan cannon which had been in service with the Israel Air Force in the past and received modifications as the "Racquet" variant. It is a six-barrel rotary cannon able to fire 22mm 6,000 rounds per minute. This cannon was stationed on top of an armored personnel carrier (APC), originally designed to shoot down aircraft, mainly slow ones, and surfboards.
As the planes became faster, and the threats became missiles and rockets, its use decreased, until it was retired in 2006 after the Second Lebanon War. Now the security establishment is considering reusing the Vulcan. The UAVs fly slowly enough, and this is a relatively cheap solution, although the problem of detection remains. It will probably be designated to protect military facilities. In May, for example, a Hezbollah UAV hit the large Sky Dew observation balloon located near the Golani junction in the north. It's possible that some Vulcans could have protected it. "The Vulcan was very useful in the Yom Kippur War, it was a fantastic weapon," recalls Brigadier General (Res.) Kochav.
Is this the solution? Vulcan from a generation ago?
"Even the Vulcan will not perform 100 percent. It will add 5-10%. But eventually, the drone is made up of an engine and a propeller. It's a very simple engine. In terms of the aviation world, a UAV is going backward, so the anti-aircraft missile is also going backward. But make no mistake, there are also other methods, some are classified."
The official in the DDR&D also assures that Israel is developing interception solutions for UAVs. "There are technologies in Israel's arsenal that have not yet been deployed. We have already spent hundreds of millions of shekels on solutions to the threats of drones and UAVs. Besides, Iron Dome, Barak (a defense system against naval missiles), and also pilots, know how to intercept these threats, as they resemble military UAVs.
The challenge is posed by radio-controlled planes, kites, and products that one can buy on AliExpress. In that case, we take measures that are more suitable for drones."
Prof. Weihs from the Technion emphasizes that the solution for UAVs involves money. If a UAV costs a few thousand dollars, but intercepting it costs ten times as much, this is a problem. "So, one of the challenges is not how to take down drones, but rather to take them down cheaply," he explains. "You use fighter jets or Iron Dome, which cost a lot of money, against a small, cheap aircraft. If something costs ten thousand dollars and you use a hundred thousand dollars to shoot it down, it won't last long. And there's another problem. Once you launch interceptors above a populated area, pieces of the interceptors can fall and injure people."
So, what can be both cheap, effective and safe?
"Disruptions, for example. But to disrupt drones, one has to be familiar with the system. The disruption should focus specifically on the direction of the UAV. Too much disruption might act against you as well. This is one of the problems. On the other hand, if you try to disrupt at a great distance, the power is lessened."
Can this also help us in the event of a swarm drone attack?
"It's difficult, but possible. A swarm is centralized, so you can transmit the disruption to focus only on it."
In the end, everyone hopes that the "Magen Or" laser system will be operational soon and could provide a solution to the UAV threat. The system, which will be Israel's first air defense layer, will launch a powerful laser beam toward the UAV during its flight. The laser is supposed to produce a high temperature, thus causing the drone to explode in the air or it will be taken down. It's a relatively cheap solution (each laser launch will cost about a thousand dollars, compared to about $50,000 interceptor of the Iron Dome). However, the system is still in experimental phases, and the best-case scenario will be operational next year. "The goal of the Ministry of Defense is to deploy a powerful laser system as part of the Iron Dome architecture," explains an official from the Ministry of Defense.
How will it work?
"The 'brain' will make an automatic decision whether to launch a laser beam or an interceptor that hits the target. The British have the DragonFire laser which is under development; the South Koreans introduced it a month ago a small laser, and of course, the Americans, have a mobile laser system. But we are developing a ground laser for air defense purposes. By the way, there are other variations of a powerful laser, which will eventually be able to intercept high-altitude threats, but this will take a decade to develop."
Not everyone is convinced that laser is the magic solution. Lior Segal is CEO at Third Eye Systems. Shortly before October 7, his company developed "Meduza" an electro-optical scanning system dedicated to drone recognition. "The arsenal developed by the big industries doesn't know how to respond to small objects (like UAVs)," he says. "The use of laser, for example, in my eyes is an amazing idea that was efficient ten years ago, but it does not offer a magic solution for UAVs, because it is a super-expensive system, and above all because the northern border is complex in terms of its topography. These are not the plainlands of Ukraine. The laser is "Nice to have", but it will not solve all our problems. Rafael is unlikely to develop a drone that intercepts a drone; so this is where small companies like ours fit in and make the difference".
Still, the hole in Israel's sky is open. Prof. Weihs however believes, from his many years of experience, and as someone who was there when the first Tadiran-made UAVs went into the air, that "every threat is eventually resolved," he states.
And then what?
"Then comes the next generation."
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